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591 
THE LIABILITY OF ORDINARY SOLDIERS FOR 
CRIMES OF AGGRESSION 
DAVID RODIN∗ 
Aggression has long been considered the preeminent international 
crime. Yet, the vast majority of agents involved in perpetrating this 
crime—the individual officers and soldiers who fight in aggressive wars—
are never held to account either in law or in broader moral terms. At 
Nuremburg, a decision was made to concentrate prosecutions on only the 
most senior leadership of the Nazi party and military. There was no 
attempt to prosecute lower ranking officers, ordinary soldiers, sailors, and 
airmen who had not themselves committed atrocities nor breaches of jus in 
bello.  
This “liability gap”-the fact that sovereigns and statesmen, but not 
subordinate officers and soldiers, are liable for jus ad bellum offences-is 
one of the great puzzles of international law and ethics. In this essay I 
examine the philosophical foundation of combatants’ war rights and the 
basis for liability for ad bellum offences. I conclude that there is at least a 
theoretical basis for extending liability for the crime of aggression to 
ordinary soldiers and lower ranking officers. 
Traditional just war theory and the current Laws of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC) assume two principles or theses: 
1. “the symmetry thesis” which states that the content of jus in bello 
rights and obligations are the same for combatants on both sides of 
any conflict.  
2. “the independence thesis” which states that the in bello rights and 
obligations of a combatant in war are independent of the ad bellum 
justice of the war in which he or she fights.  
Together, the symmetry and independence theses imply that ordinary 
soldiers who participate in an unjust war do no wrong so long as they do 
not violate the norms of jus in bello. But both claims can be subject to 
important theoretical criticisms as I will explain below. These criticisms 
suggest that the norms of war should instead be interpreted in a way that is 
asymmetric (meaning that jus in bello rights and obligations are not always 
the same for combatants on both sides a conflict) and dependent 
 
 
 ∗  Program on the Changing Character War, Oxford University; Centre for Applied Philosophy 
and Public Ethics, Australian National University. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 591 Rodin book pages.doc10/29/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
592 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 6:591 
 
 
 
 
(suggesting that jus in bello rights are dependent on ad bellum justice). 
The most important of these arguments concern four main ideas: the role 
of self-defense in the justification of war; the nature of responsibility and 
excuse; the proper interpretation of in bello proportionality; and 
consequentialism. I will briefly review these four lines of argument and 
then suggest that they are partially, though not entirely, correct. 
Nonetheless, these arguments are sufficient to compel us to think seriously 
about extending liability for crimes of aggression beyond heads of state to 
include common soldiers and mid-ranking officers.1 
I. FOUR ARGUMENTS FOR ASYMMETRY 
A. The Self-Defense Argument 
Self-defense is today the single most important legal and ethical 
justification for war. If one interprets self-defense to include the defense of 
others, then it is also possible to view the emerging norm of humanitarian 
intervention as part of the extended right of self and other-defense.2  
The basic challenge of the self-dense argument can be stated as 
follows: if legitimate acts of war are viewed as instances of, or analogous 
to, legitmate acts of self-defense, then this seems to entail the rejection of 
the symmetry and independence theses. This is because, unlike a right of 
self-preservation, a right of self-defense contains limitations on the 
permissible objects of defensive force. Legitimate defensive force may 
only be directed against persons who are morally or legally liable for it. 
Traditionally just war theory has attempted to explain the liability for force 
through a morally neutral specification of non-innocence: soldiers at war 
are deemed to be non-innocent, and therefore liable for force, because they 
are engaged in a harmful activity, irrespective of whether the harmful 
activity is justified or unjustified.3  
But this account of liability is demonstrably false. One does not 
become liable to force by engaging in a harmful activity that is itself 
 
 
 1. The issues surrounding symmetry and independence in the norms of war are explored in 
greater detail in JUST AND UNJUST WARRIORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF COMBATANTS 
(David Rodin & Henry Shue eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (forthcoming 2008). 
 2. I have recently raised doubts about the ability of self-defense to justify wars not authorized 
by a legitimate global authority, however self-defense remains the dominant paradigm of justified war 
within legal and ethical thought. See DAVID RODIN, WAR AND SELF-DEFENSE pt. 2 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2002). 
 3. See G.E.M. Anscombe, War and Murder, in ETHICS, RELIGION AND POLITICS 51 (1981); 
G.E.M. Anscombe, Mr. Truman’s Degree, in ETHICS, RELIGION AND POLITICS 62 (1981). Of note, 
noccentes, the Latin root of the modern word innocent, means “harmful.” 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss3/11
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justified. Thus, one is permitted to kill an unjustified aggressor in defense, 
but one is not permitted to kill a justified attacker, such as a police officer 
who is using lawful force in the course of official duties, nor a victim of 
aggression who is using lethal force in legitimate self-defense. For a 
person to become liable for force seems to entail, at the minimum, that he 
or she is currently engaged in the unjustified harming, threatening, or 
attacking of a person or that person’s legitimate interests.4  
But of course, according to just war theory, a soldier who is fighting in 
a justified war of defense and is abiding by the rules of jus in bello is 
precisely such a justified user of force: that soldier is not engaged in 
unjustified harming, threatening, or attacking of any other person or that 
other person’s legitimate interests. Soldiers fighting in a just war therefore 
seem to lack liability for force being used against them. It would seem to 
follow that while soldiers fighting in a just war (“just combatants”) are 
permitted to use force against the enemy, soldiers fighting in an unjust war 
(“unjust combatants”) are not. Soldiers fighting in an unjust war do not 
enjoy a symmetrical privilege to kill, and they presumptively should be 
held liable for unjust killing after the conflict. 
The philosopher who has done the most to develop this line of 
argument is Jeff McMahan.5 McMahan’s account is premised on a very 
strident example of what I call in War and Self-Defense the “reductive” 
account of war.6 He attempts to provide an explanatory account of war 
that reduces the rights and responsibilities of combatants at war entirely to 
the rights and responsibilities of individual persons. McMahan says 
“justified warfare just is the collective exercise of individual rights of self 
and other-defense in a coordinated manner against a common threat.”7 
This reductive account is quite radical, and has revisionary implications in 
many areas of the ethics of war. But the self-defense problem arises for 
any view of war that sees self-defense as the primary locus of the 
justification for the violence of war, and holds that the tenets of normal 
interpersonal morality remain relevant to individuals at war.  
Even if one holds that normative relations in war are necessarily 
mediated through super-personal entities such as the state or nation, one 
must still explain why individual soldiers in war no longer possess their 
 
 
 4. For a stronger view according to which liability to defensive force requires a degree of 
culpability for the unjustified act, see RODIN, supra note 2, pt. 1, ch. 4. 
 5. See Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, 114 ETHICS 693 (July 2004). For an earlier 
statement of his views, see Jeff McMahan, Innocence, Self-Defense and Killing in War, 2 J. POL. PHIL. 
193 (1994). 
 6. See RODIN, supra note 2, pt. 2, ch. 6. 
 7. McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, supra note 5, at 717.  
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ordinary human right not to be killed. The problem with using the concept 
of self-defense in providing this explanation is that the liberty of self-
defense is inherently and necessarily asymmetrical: identifying a class of 
justified defensive actors seems to logically entail identifying a class of 
unjustified actors. The argument from self-defense thus constitutes a 
significant challenge for mainstream just war theory, by suggesting that 
unjust combatants are not justified in using force against just combatants. 
B. The Responsibility Argument 
An obvious response to the self-defense argument is to concede that, 
while soldiers fighting in an unjust war are not justified in using force 
against the enemy, they are nonetheless excused. The symmetry thesis is 
false at the level of justification (only soldiers fighting in a just war are 
truly justified in their use of violence), but it is true at the level of 
culpability and impunity (soldiers on neither side are culpable and they are 
immune from blame and punishment—soldiers on the just side because 
their force is justified; soldiers on the unjust side because they are 
excused). This conclusion is less than Michael Walzer’s celebrated “equal 
right to kill,”8 for the excused unjust combatants do not possess a liberty 
or permission to kill, but it does ground a significant and wide-ranging 
impunity from blame and punishment. 
Why might one think that soldiers fighting in an unjust war are excused 
for their use of force? The most common suggestions are that unjust 
combatants are excused by reason of duress or of non-culpable ignorance. 
However, these claims do not cohere with our normal standards of liability 
in criminal law nor in inter-personal ethics.9 Although soldiers at war do 
face significant coercive pressures, in many cases these pressures fall short 
of the threat of execution for those who refuse to fight. Even in cases in 
which a soldier faces death if that soldier does not fight, this may not 
excuse wrongful killing because duress is not recognized as an excuse for 
homicide in many jurisdictions. In domestic society we often expect a 
person to prefer death rather than commit wrongful killing, which seems 
just and appropriate.10 Furthermore, even if we were to recognize the 
 
 
 8. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 41 (1977). 
 9. I develop this argument in RODIN, supra note 2, at 165–73. For a nuanced and more 
sympathetic discussion, see David R. Mapel, Coerced Moral Agents? Individual Responsibility for 
Military Service, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 171 (1998). 
 10. David Mapel makes the interesting point that, since fear of death (cowardice) is not 
recognized as an excuse for dereliction of duty in war, it is unclear why fear of death should be 
recognized for the more stringent requirement not to engage in wrongful killing. Id. at 178.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss3/11
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coercive measures of military discipline as sufficient to excuse wrongful 
killing in war, this would not necessarily establish the innocence of 
soldiers who kill in an unjust war. The excuse may be only partial, thereby 
leaving substantial room for criminal liability. Moreover, unjust 
combatants could still be liable if they volunteered or allowed themselves 
to be drafted when there was a reasonable likelihood that they would be 
required to engage in wrongful killing (in the same way that someone who 
wrongfully kills while voluntarily intoxicated can be held liable: not 
because he is responsible for the killing, but because he is responsible for 
becoming intoxicated when this can reasonably be foreseen to lead to 
wrongdoing). 
Similar problems arise with the suggestion that wrongful killing in war 
may be excused by reason of ignorance. While it is true that military 
commanders and government officials restrict access to relevant 
information and routinely engage in deception of soldiers and citizens, 
there often exist other channels of relevant information—at least within 
democratic societies with an active free press. Indeed, a source of 
embarrassment to the proponent of the excuse response is that both the 
duress and the ignorance excuses seem more applicable to soldiers of 
authoritarian states than they do to those of democratic states. This leaves 
open the possibility that soldiers of authoritarian states may enjoy the 
privilege of impunity for killing in war, whereas those of democratic states 
do not, thus suggesting yet another way in which the norms of jus in bello 
might apply asymmetrically. But even within non-democratic societies, 
access to relevant information is at least increasing with technologies such 
as the Internet. This may be sufficient to a morally reflective person to 
make a reasonable assessment of the justice of war.  
Francisco de Vitoria argued that ordinary soldiers are not obligated to 
investigate the justness of the wars in which they fight, but that they 
should not fight if they happen to discover that their war is not just 
(Walzer is reluctant to grant even this weak exception).11 But such a 
position inverts the ordinary burdens of evidence in a remarkable way. In a 
normal case of self-defense, we prohibit the killing of other persons unless 
there is clear and compelling evidence that they are about to engage in an 
unjust attack; we do not permit the killing of other persons unless there is 
clear and compelling evidence that they are not engaged in an unjust 
attack. 
 
 
 11. Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis Relectio Posterior, Sive de Jure Belle [On the Law of War], in 
2.2 VITORIA: POLITICAL WRITINGS §§ 22, 25 (Jeremy Lawrence & Anthony Pagden eds., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1991). See also WALZER, supra note 8, at 39. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In any case, the excuse response can be nothing more than a stop-gap 
in the argument. Even if some, or even the majority, of soldiers in an 
unjust war are innocent of wrongdoing by reason of excuse, it is highly 
implausible to suppose that all soldiers will be excused in all wars. If one 
believes that wrongful killing is a serious crime, this seems to entail 
advocating some kind of judicial investigation of particular cases with the 
possibility of criminal sanctions. As Robert Nozick aptly put it, “some 
bucks stop with each of us; and we reject the morally elitist view that 
some soldiers cannot be expected to think for themselves.”12 
C. The Proportionality Argument 
One of the most interesting arguments against the symmetry and 
independence theses is the argument from proportionality. The great 
difficulty with in bello proportionality is how to interpret the comparative 
value judgment that this norm requires us to make. In just war theory, the 
norm has generally been understood to require the collateral costs to non-
combatants of a particular military action to not be disproportionate to its 
expected military utility. In legal terms, the norm prohibits any attack that 
“may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.”13 
But how are we to balance the value of obtaining a certain degree of 
military utility against the harm to noncombatants? It seems clear that 
obtaining “concrete and direct military advantage” (e.g., capturing a bridge 
or halting the enemy’s advance) has no intrinsic moral value, but only 
instrumental value which it obtains from the broader project of which it is 
a part. This seems to imply that the value of achieving a military objective 
is determined by the ad bellum justice of the conflict of which it is a part: 
it is only a moral value to achieve a determinate military advantage if the 
war of which it is a part is itself morally just. If the war is unjust, then 
achieving a military outcome advantageous to its end has negative rather 
than positive moral value. This suggests an asymmetric and dependent 
interpretation of jus in bello: those fighting a just war may inflict harm 
(including foreseen but unintended harm on noncombatants) to a level 
 
 
 12. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 100 (1974). 
 13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) art. 51, June 8, 1977 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
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which is a function of the goodness of their cause, and the contribution a 
given military action makes to the cause. But, those fighting an unjust war 
may not inflict any harm on non-combatants, for (their cause being unjust) 
there is no good which could render the harmful effects proportional.14  
The proportionality argument also suggests that soldiers fighting in a 
just war may enjoy increased in bello privileges compared to those 
currently granted by jus in bello norms. An action yielding a given 
quantum of military advantage might justify different levels of collateral 
harm depending on the contextual justice of its cause. On this view, a 
combatant fighting a war of exceptional justness and importance might 
possess exceptional permissions to inflict high levels of collateral harm on 
non-combatants. Thus, this argument, as well as suggesting the reduction 
or removal of the combat privileges of unjust combatants, suggests an 
augmenting of privileges (or a reduction of prohibitions) for just 
combatants.  
D. The Consequentialist Argument 
The proportionality norm involves comparing harms and benefits 
within the constraints of a deontological prohibition on the intentional 
harming of non-combatants. The consequentialist argument extends the 
reasoning of the proportionality argument to all acts of war. If the aims of 
a particular war are just and important, then, from a consequentialist 
perspective, it is mysterious why the just combatants should be bound by 
any in bello prohibitions at all in cases where the risk-adjusted expected 
outcome of violating them is morally preferable to the risk-adjusted 
outcome of not violating them. Similarly, it is mysterious why the unjust 
combatants should possess any in bello privileges. For such privileges 
assist in the achievement of unjust war aims, which are ex hypothesi a 
moral evil.15 
 
 
 14. Variants of this argument are discussed by Thomas Hurka and Jeff McMahan. See generally 
Thomas Hurka, Proportionality in the Morality of War, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 34, 45 (2004); 
McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, supra note 5. McMahan argues that the general claim that 
military acts of an unjust combatant can never fulfill the proportionality requirement must be qualified. 
McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, supra note 5. The reason is military actions by a soldier 
fighting an unjust war can be proportionate if it is directed solely against wrongful acts of soldiers on 
the just side (e.g., action that is itself disproportionate or is in pursuit of unjust aims within an 
otherwise just war). But, as he himself notes, this kind of case is “anomalous,” id. at 715, and its 
impact on the general anti-symmetry argument will be negligible. Id. at 704. 
 15. Obviously, thoroughgoing consequentialists would provide a very different account of the jus 
ad bellum from that found in traditional just war theory.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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II. TWO FORMS OF ASYMMETRY 
These four arguments constitute a strong philosophical case against 
symmetry and independence. Yet it must be accepted that the conclusion 
of these arguments strike many people as deeply implausible. They 
certainly contradict the mainstream of just war theory and international 
legal theory. In this section I will argue that the key to reconciling the 
strong theoretical arguments for asymmetry with their apparently 
implausible conclusions lies is making, and correctly applying, the 
following distinction. While there is only one way to formulate the 
symmetry thesis there are two different forms of asymmetry which may 
yield numerous distinguishable formulations of the asymmetry theses. To 
see this, consider the following diagrammatic representation of jus in bello 
norms. See Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1 
 
The current in bello norms are represented here by two equal lines at 
the centre of the diagram. These norms create both privileges and 
prohibitions. Thus, action that falls into the zone above the line is 
prohibited (broadly, this consists in the intentional harming of non-
combatants, the unnecessary harming of combatants, and the 
disproportionate or unnecessary, unintentional harming of non-
combatants). Military action that falls into the zone below the line is 
privileged (broadly, this consists of the intentional harming of combatants 
and the proportionate and necessary, unintentional harming of 
noncombatants). We might understand the privilege in two different ways. 
It might consist of a justification for action that falls below the line, or it 
Just 
Combatants 
Unjust 
Combatants 
In Bello 
privileges 
Current Jus in 
Bello norms 
In Bello 
prohibitions 
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might simply consist of an excuse leading to impunity from moral blame 
or legal punishment for such action. 
There are, however, several distinguishable ways in which we could 
formulate an asymmetry thesis. We could deny in bello privileges to the 
unjust side, or we could grant superior in bello privileges to the just side. 
Or, we could do both as in the diagram below. See Figure 2. 
FIGURE 2 
 
I shall refer to the claim that just combatants have increased in bello 
privileges compared to the current interpretation of jus in bello as 
“permissive asymmetry,” and I shall refer to the claim that unjust 
combatants have reduced or no in bello privileges as “restrictive 
asymmetry.” As with the symmetry thesis, we may distinguish between in 
bello privileges, which amount to a justification, and privileges, which 
amount only to an excuse leading to impunity from moral blame and legal 
punishment. 
Clearly there is no logically necessary reason why permissive and 
restrictive asymmetry should be asserted or denied together. Indeed, the 
two forms of asymmetry are suggested in different ways by the four 
arguments discussed above. The self-defense argument and the 
responsibility argument suggest that soldiers fighting in an unjust war 
should not be granted the in bello privilege of killing with impunity. But, 
these arguments do not suggest that just combatants should enjoy 
increased in bello privileges. On the other hand, the proportionality and 
the consequentialist arguments support increased privileges for the just, 
and reduced or eliminated privileges for the unjust.  
In Bello  
privileges 
Current Jus in  
Bello norms 
In Bello 
prohibitions 
Just 
Combatants 
Unjust  
Combatants 
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With the distinction between permissive and restrictive asymmetry in 
place, how should we respond to the arguments against the symmetry and 
independence theses? My own view is that the symmetry thesis should be 
rejected, but the doctrine of asymmetry is only half right. Specifically, my 
hypothesis is that permissive asymmetry is false, but restrictive asymmetry 
is true.  
III. A CONTRACTARIAN ARGUMENT  
In order to support this hypothesis, I will develop a simple 
contractarian argument. This argument draws conclusions about the 
appropriate configuration of moral rules by enquiring how rational agents, 
choosing under ideal conditions of impartiality, would configure them.  
Contractarian arguments are an attractive way of approaching problems 
like the rules of war for a number of reasons. As an ethical thought 
experiment, they provide a structured way to generate concrete moral 
conclusions on specific issues. Moreover, when properly constructed, a 
contractarian thought experiment can integrate deontological and 
consequentialist aspects of our moral experience. With its emphasis on 
impartiality and the rational consent of free agents, a contractarian 
approach captures key aspects of the concept of justice.16 At the same 
time, because the hypothetical contractors in the original position are 
influenced by a concern for their own future welfare, contractarian 
arguments can also be utilized to generate rule-consequentialist 
conclusions. Richard Brandt, for example, uses a contractarian argument 
to explore a rule utilitarian approach to war in his classic article, 
Utilitarianism and the Rules of War.17  
We are to imagine all potential parties to war in an original position 
from which they have full factual knowledge about the world but no 
knowledge of how they will be situated within it. Thus the parties know 
about the political, sociological, psychological, and technical aspects of 
war and conflict, and they know that, on occasion, their own state will be 
involved in war, but they do not know whether they will be soldiers or 
civilians, whether they will be members of the winning or the losing side, 
or whether they will be members of the just or the unjust side of a given 
 
 
 16. Since the publication of Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, the contractarian approach has been 
strongly linked to arguments about the nature of justice. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harvard 
Univ. Press 1999) (1971). 
 17. Richard Brandt, Utilitarianism and the Rules of War, in ABSOLUTISM AND ITS 
CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITICS (Joram G. Haber ed., Rowman & Littlefield 1994) (1972).  
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conflict.18 We need not make the implausible assumption that the 
contractors are pure rational hedonists, who are concerned solely with 
their own future happiness or welfare. Instead, it is more helpful to 
conceive of agents in the original position as possessing a reasonable 
desire that their own behavior comply with important and well established 
pre-existing moral commitments and requirements.  
Thus, I will suppose that the contractors in my thought experiment are 
motivated both by a self-interested concern for their own future welfare 
and by a desire to respect important rights. For the sake of simplicity, I 
will also assume that my contractors have already reached a consensus on 
the basic content of both the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and that these 
norms are generally in conformity with standard current interpretations.  
What remains for the original contractors to decide is how the jus in 
bello component of the laws of war relates to the jus ad bellum 
component. Would ideal rational agents adopt a symmetry interpretation 
of jus in bello, or would they opt for permissive or restrictive asymmetry, 
or both? 
Let us consider the question of permissive asymmetry first by 
examining the suggestion that just combatants, because of the justice of 
their cause, have increased in bello privileges. Contractors in an original 
position would have decisive reasons for rejecting permissive asymmetry. 
Why is this? The conclusion stems from two facts accessible to contractors 
within the original position. First, across the universe of possible wars, 
most combatants at most times will be engaged in wars that are unjust. 
Second, when engaged in an unjust war, most combatants will mistakenly 
believe their war to be just.  
How are these two claims substantiated? The first claim would seem to 
be a simple logical consequence of just war theory itself. It may be derived 
from the observation that, under standard interpretations of jus ad bellum, 
it is not possible for a war to be just on both sides simultaneously, but that 
it is possible (and indeed relatively common) for a war to be unjust on 
 
 
 18. There is an important question as to whether the contractors in the original position are to be 
conceived as individuals or as the representative of states or peoples. In A Theory of Justice and The 
Law of Peoples, Rawls supposes that the norms of international justice are to be determined by ideal 
agreement between the representatives of peoples and collective political and ethnic entities, rather 
than individual persons. RAWLS, supra note 16.  
 I am skeptical of this interpretation of social contract theory in international relations. It appears to 
me to be inconsistent with the individualistic underpinnings of social contract theory. However, for our 
present purposes, we need not settle this issue because I believe that the same interpretation of jus in 
bello would result whether we conceive of the original contract as made by individuals or the 
representatives of peoples. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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both sides.19 Contractors in the original position can therefore know a 
priori that, at most, fifty percent of all wars (understood as the prosecution 
of a war by one party) can be just. If all wars are just on one side and 
unjust on the other side, then the percentage of just wars will be fifty 
percent; if some wars are unjust on both sides then the percentage will be 
less than fifty percent. Therefore, if at least one conflict in the universe of 
possible wars is fought unjustly on both sides, then the majority of all 
possible wars are fought unjustly, and the majority of combatants across 
the total class of wars will be unjust combatants.20 
Despite the predominance of unjust over just war, most combatants 
believe their wars to be just whether they are in fact just or not. This claim 
is supported by three observations available to the original contractors: 
one historical, one psychological, and one about the moral structure of 
war.  
It seems to be true that, historically, the majority of wars have been 
claimed to be just on both sides. Many twentieth century wars were 
claimed to be wars of self-defense by both sides. Some of these claims 
may simply represent bad faith and propaganda on the part of war-leaders. 
But, there is good reason to believe that soldiers and statesmen often 
sincerely believe their wars to be just, whether or not they are in fact just. 
This is because of an important fact about the psychology of war. War is 
so difficult, so dangerous, and so costly, that it is exceptionally difficult 
for ordinary humans to undertake it without believing that they are in 
pursuit of a cause that is noble and just.21 This psychological observation 
is linked to a fact about the moral structure of war; namely, in most wars, 
justice is one of the matters at issue between the competing sides. That is 
to say, war typically occurs when rational forms of discourse and conflict 
 
 
 19. This is a consequence of basic principles of just war theory, and it is a feature of modern 
international law. Classical statements of this doctrine can be found in the writings of Grotius and 
Vitoria. See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES [THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 
THREE BOOKS] Book II (1646), reprinted in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 565 (Francis W. 
Kelsey trans., James B. Scott ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1925); Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis Relectio 
Posterior, Sive de Jure Belle [on the Law of War], in 2.4 VITORIA: POLITICAL WRITINGS 313 (Jeremy 
Lawrence & Anthony Pagden eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991). For the position of modern 
international law, see generally YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 168 
(1988). 
 20. This last claim contains an implicit assumption concerning numbers. The assumption is that 
just wars are not on average fought with more combatants than unjust wars. This does not seem an 
unreasonable assumption to make. 
 21. Of course, there have always been mercenaries—soldiers motivated in part or in whole by the 
material rewards of war—as well as simple marauders, who raid and kill for nothing more than booty. 
But, at least since the French Revolution, the great wars have not been sustained primarily by 
mercenary motives, but by mass ideologies with concomitant beliefs about the justice of war. 
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resolution (e.g., negotiation, arbitration, legal adjudication) have failed. If 
combatants agreed with respect to which party had justice on their side, 
they would not need to have recourse to war. War begins where moral 
consensus ends. Typically the breakdown of rational moral discourse and 
agreement is one of the factors that precipitate war. Because most conflicts 
arise from competing interpretations of circumstances relating to justice, it 
is to be expected that most combatants in most wars will believe 
themselves to be fighting a just war.22 
Suppose, then, it is true that: (1) most wars in which combatants may 
potentially fight will be unjust; and, (2) when engaged in an unjust war, 
most combatants will mistakenly believe their war to be just. Given this, 
contractors would have decisive reasons to reject permissive asymmetry. 
Accepting it would expose them and their compatriots to two significant 
forms of risk on the battlefield: one is a form of moral risk and the other is 
a form of physical risk.  
First, contractors would be exposed to a moral risk. If permissive 
asymmetry were adopted as an interpretation of jus in bello, contractors 
would run a high risk of fighting in a war that they believe to be just, but 
which was in fact unjust. In such a circumstance, they would inflict 
incidental harm on non-combatants in accordance with a mistakenly 
liberal interpretation of proportionality, which was not in fact morally 
justified (e.g., they would ascribe to themselves an increased liberty to 
inflict collateral damage on enemy non-combatants). Thus, they would be 
exposed to a high moral risk of committing serious injustice in war.23 
Second, contractors would be exposed to a physical risk. Suppose that 
the contractors found themselves fighting a just war, and it was their 
opponents who were fighting an unjust war they believed to be just. Then, 
the contractors would be exposed to a risk of increased physical harm, 
because their enemies would inflict upon them unjust and excessive 
collateral harm due to a mistakenly liberal interpretation of the 
proportionality requirement.  
Would these significant risks, entailed by accepting permissive 
asymmetry, be balanced by any countervailing advantages? It does not 
appear so. Even in a case in which the contractors found themselves 
 
 
 22. To say that the mistaken belief in the justice of one’s war is common is not to say that it is 
morally justified or even excusable. It is, instead, simply to say that there are strong psychological and 
sociological forces motivating self-deception. Wars are often motivated by real disagreements as to 
justice or right, but it does not mean that these disagreements are reasonable.  
 23. As I explained above, I take my original contractors to be motivated not only by egoistic self-
interest, but also by a desire to respect important moral commitments such as basic human rights.  
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fighting a genuinely just war, permissive asymmetry would not yield any 
significant military advantage in achieving the just war aims. It is likely 
that the unjust enemy, believing themselves to be just, would simply 
ascribe to themselves equal in bello privileges. Hence, the total 
destructiveness of the war would be increased without yielding either side 
any decisive military advantage. 
Permissive asymmetry is not sustainable as an ethic of war because of 
the radical unreliability of the ad bellum judgements that combatants can 
be expected to make in the course of a war. Permitting a combatant to 
apply a norm of permissive asymmetric privilege would be like permitting 
a criminal defendant to try and sentence his or her own case, or like 
permitting a party to mediate his or her own dispute. No plausible 
principle of justice would allow such practices. 
What then of restrictive asymmetry—the claim that unjust combatants 
should be denied in bello privileges? Would contractors in the original 
position accept or reject this thesis? Unlike permissive asymmetry, 
restrictive asymmetry is a conservative moral principle in the sense that it 
limits rather than augments military privileges. Because of this, it does not 
bring moral and physical risks of the form we have just discussed, even 
assuming that ad bellum judgements are often unreliably made in the 
context of war. Indeed, one of its most attractive features is that it 
contracts rather than expands the scope for permissible harm in war. 
But the risks of restrictive asymmetry may be of a different kind. For 
example, it might be thought that holding soldiers liable for participation 
in an unjust war would adversely affect the ability of states to organize and 
maintain effective military defense forces. Restrictive asymmetry may 
carry the risk of making just states vulnerable to aggression.  
However, it is unclear that restrictive asymmetry would endanger just 
states. First, there is no strong empirical evidence linking individual 
responsibility to reduced military effectiveness. Second, even if there is 
such a link, the security of a just state depends on two factors: its ability to 
organize and maintain effective defensive forces, and the ability of any 
potential aggressor to organize and maintain effective offensive forces. 
Given that the norm prohibiting offensive war is tolerably clear, the 
potential corrosive effects of individual responsibility on military 
effectiveness would be felt most strongly by a potential aggressor rather 
than a defender. Restrictive asymmetry would therefore likely increase the 
net security of just states, even if it does reduce the effectiveness of 
individual fighting forces. 
A second form of risk concerns the possibility that restrictive 
asymmetry might reduce the likelihood that unjust combatants would 
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comply with important current in bello prohibitions, such as the norms of 
non-combatant immunity, necessity, and proportionality. It has been 
suggested that noncombatant immunity is simply the flip side of 
combatant nonimmunity, so that you cannot have one without the other.24 
But, an analysis of the structure of moral obligations disproves this; 
combatant nonimmunity is not a correlate of noncombatant nonimmunity.  
This can be seen in the diagram below which represents the view of jus 
in bello in which permissive asymmetry is rejected and restrictive 
symmetry is accepted. See Figure 3. This represents what I believe to be 
the correct interpretation of jus in bello. Currently accepted in bello 
restrictions, based as they are on basic human rights, apply equally to both 
parties; however, currently accepted in bello privileges apply only to the 
just combatants. There are certainly no conceptual difficulties with such a 
deontic scheme. 
FIGURE 3 
 
However, the objection may be rephrased in another way: the real issue 
is not that the combatant privileges and prohibitions cannot be 
conceptually distinguished, but that unjust combatants will have no 
incentive to comply with currently accepted in bello prohibitions if they 
are not granted equal war privileges. If there is no moral distinction 
between harming just combatants and harming non-combatants, then there 
 
 
 24. Lene Bomann-Larsen suggests this in her helpful article on symmetrical war rights. Lene 
Bomann-Larsen, Licence to Kill? The Question of Just vs. Unjust Combatants, 3 J. MIL. ETHICS 142, 
145–46 (2004). 
Current Jus in  
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is little incentive for unjust combatants to abstain from the latter given that 
they are already committed to attacking the former.  
However, it is simply not the case that restrictive asymmetry is 
committed to the proposition that there is no moral distinction between 
harming just combatants and harming non-combatants. The correct 
interpretation of restrictive asymmetry is that while harming just 
combatants in an unjust war is wrong, harming non-combatants is worse. 
The currently accepted in bello prohibitions can be understood as 
aggravating conditions of the broader crime of participating in an unjust 
war.25 This is of course the way we deal with the punishment of criminal 
action in domestic criminal law. For example a bank robber who kills an 
armed guard attempting to stop the robbery is guilty of murder, but a 
robber who capriciously kills an unarmed customer may be guilty of 
murder with aggravating circumstances. For this reason, there are few 
legitimate worries about perverse incentives in adopting restrictive 
asymmetry. 
A final and important area of concern with the proposal of restrictive 
asymmetry is the issue of victor’s justice. While the trails at Nuremberg 
met very high standards of procedural justice, there are compelling reasons 
for contractors in the original position not to grant war victors the right to 
try and punish enemy combatants for acts of war that comply with current 
in bello norms. The primary reason is that states and combatants cannot be 
expected to reliably determine the justice of their own cause. We expect 
that any victors in war will declare themselves just and their enemy unjust. 
In such a context, victor’s justice would merely become a euphemism for 
revenge and retaliation with little meaningful correspondence between the 
“punishments” inflicted on soldiers and their individual or even collective 
liability. 
Concern about victor’s justice is therefore warranted. But, it must be 
noted, this concern is not an objection to restrictive asymmetry. We must 
distinguish between liability to punishment in the agent of crime and the 
authority to punish in the agent of justice. Restrictive asymmetry is a claim 
about the former, whereas victor’s justice is a problem with the latter. 
Thus, a criminal may be culpable of infamous crimes and be liable for 
punishment, even if, because of corruption, partiality, and illegitimacy, 
there is no court with the authority to punish that criminal. Soldiers who 
fight in an unjust war, and who are not excused by reason of duress or 
 
 
 25. Jeff McMahan makes this point. McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, supra note 5, at 
702. 
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nonculpable ignorance, are liable to punishment—just not at the hands of 
an unreliable process of victor’s justice. Legitimate punishment of war 
crimes requires (as does the punishment of any crime) a legitimate 
punitive authority that must, minimally, display independence, neutrality, 
and impartiality.  
One might respond that such a conclusion robs restrictive asymmetry 
of most of its practical impact. At present, victors are, by and large, the 
only bodies capable of punishing unjust combatants. If victors are not 
justified in punishing them, then unjust combatants in all practical respects 
enjoy legal impunity.  
Yet, it is not true that the restrictive asymmetry has no meaningful 
implications for international law. Soldiers who fight in an unjust war may 
have moral liability for ad bellum offences as well as a latent legal 
liability. It is latent in that the liability cannot result in legitimate 
prosecution and punishment in the absence of a properly authorized 
punitive body. But, this latent liability may later become actualized.  
Though not currently constituted to prosecute individual soldiers for ad 
bellum violations, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has the form of 
authority that would be required to punish unjust combatants. One 
practical legal implication of the present argument could be that the 
jurisdiction of the ICC (or a potential successor) should be developed to 
include the liability of individual soldiers for ad bellum crimes, just as 
today it has jurisdiction over soldiers for in bello crimes. There would be 
enormous political, institutional, and legal challenges to developing such a 
proposal in the real world. But the asymmetry arguments explored here 
counsel that this should become a long-term ethical objective of 
international politics. 
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